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Special Comment
By PAUL FrEmnicK HELFER*
THE UNITED STATES COMMISSIONER-A LITTLE KNOWN
COMPONENT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A. Tim OFFICE
United States commissioners form an integral and important
part of the federal judicial system, yet their role is not widely
known despite origins which go as far back as 1793.1 By statute
each United States district court is authorized to "appoint United
States commissioners in such numbers as it deems advisable."2
According to the latest available figures there are 691 commis-
sioners now serving; however, only twenty-one of these are on a
full time basis.3 The term of office is four years4 and compensation
is by means of a schedule of fees prescribed by statute subject to
a maximum annual limit of 10,500 dollars.5 The district court
making the appointment determines where within the judicial
district the commissioner is to serve, the prime factor being the
volume of judicial business. In large metropolitan areas a full
time commissioner may serve along with one or more on a part
time basis.6 Commissioners are not required to be lawyers,7 al-
* Member, District of Columbia and New York Bars.1 In that year federal circuit courts were authorized to appoint "discreet
persons learned in the law" to take bail in criminal cases. 1 Stat. 334 (1793).
In 1842, commissioners of the circuit courts were given the powers of statejustices of the peace as to federal offenders. 5 Stat. 516 (1842). Circuit court
commissioners were abolished in 1896 and the United States Commissioners Act,
29 Stat. 140, 184 (1896), created the office as it exists today. For an excellent
treatment of the early development of the office of United States commissioner, see
United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).228 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1958). A district court may deem it advisable to
appoint no commissioners, abolishing the office by local court rule; this was done
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, see
Lederle, Abolish Unnecessanj Court Appendages to Improve the Administration
of Justice, 36 J. Am. Jud. Soc y 102, 104 (1952).
3 [1962] Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Ann. Rep. 165 (1963). The figures are as of June 30, 1962.
428 U.S.C. § 631(c) (1958).
528 U.S.C. § 633(l)-(8) (1958).
6 Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 798 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 951 (1960); letter from the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to the Vice President of the United States, June 11, 1953, in
1954 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3016 (1955).
7 Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 863 (1957).
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though whenever possible lawyers are appointed.8 The Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts provides each commis-
sioner with a copy of the United States Commissioner's Manual
which serves as a guide to the functions of his office.
Commissioners are not judges9 nor is there any such thing as a
"United States Commissioner's Court,"-' but it is not unusual to
find frequent reference to a commissioner as a "quasi-judicial
officer"" or as "almost but not quite a judicial officer"' 2 holding
proceedings which are "quasi-judicial in nature"; 3 however, in
evaluating his place within the federal judicial system there can
be no doubt that he is performing judicial duties and, as will be
seen, possesses considerable independent judicial power.14
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States
commissioners play a very important role in the daily administra-
tion of justice in the federal district courts; their duties and
responsibilities under these Rules is the subject of this paper.
B. ArmEST WARRANTS
Federal officers frequently file complaints before commis-
sioners seeking the issuance of arrest warrants.' 5 In determining
whether the required probable cause for issuing such a warrant
exists, the commissioner must exercise his own independent
judgment and take great care in examining the allegations con-
tained in the affidavits of the officers filing the complaint.16 It is
not enough that the warrant be sought solely on the basis of
information and belief;17 some allegation by the complaining
officer of personal knowledge of the offense must be found or
8 Griffin, United States Commissioners, 29 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 58 (1945); see
letter, op. cit. supra note 6, which refers to the commissioner as someone "who
should be a member of the bar."
9 See, e.g., Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278 282-283 (1895); Gray v.
United States, 9 F.2d 337, 338 (9th Cir. 1926); United States v. Casino, 286 Fed.
976, 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
10 Swanson v. United States, 224 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1955).11 E.g., United States v. Zerbst, 111 F. Supp. 807, 810 (E.D.S.C. 1953);
In re Pacifc Tel. & Tel. Co., 38 F.2d 833, 836 (N.D. Cal. 1930).
12 United States v. Harbin, 27 F.2d 892, 893 (N.D. Miss. 1928).
13 Freeman v. United States, 160 F.2d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1946).
14See Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 187 (1902); United States v. Berry, 4
Fed. 779, 780 (D. Colo. 1880).
15 Fed. R. Crim. P. 3, 4(a).
16 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
17 Uited States v. Lester, 21 F.R.D. 376, 384 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Application
of Field, 68 F. Supp. 961, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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the source of his belief indicated."" The commissioner has the
obligation to inquire as to the sources of the information, but if
the affidavits offered in support of the request for the warrant
allege personal knowledge, the commissioner is justified in ac-
cepting the sworn statements as true.19 Whether or not a com-
missioner may issue an arrest warrant solely on the basis of
hearsay evidence is a question the Supreme Court has expressly
left open. 0
But it has been pointed out that "it would be the better part
of wisdom for the commissioner in every case to make inquiry in
order to ascertain the extent of the complainant's knowledge so
as to be assured of the existence of probable cause."21 Once the
commissioner has determined that probable cause does exist and
issues the warrant, his action in so doing is prima facie valid, and
the defendant must bear the burden of showing any impro-
priety.22 The warrant must direct that the arresting officer bring
the defendant before the nearest available commissioner,23 who
may not be the one issuing the warrant, depending on where the
defendant is arrested and how many commissioners are serving in
the particular judicial district.
The official duties of commissioners in connection with arrest
warrants are by no means mere technical formalities, for theirs
is the very real responsibility of safeguarding the rights of an
individual against unwarranted arrest.2
C. PRuLxnm RY EXAMINATION
Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that a person arrested for a federal crime be taken before the
nearest available United States commissioner without unnecessary
delay. In Mallory v. United States,25 the Supreme Court gave
very real meaning to this provision by requiring that convictions
18 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Lathem v. United
States, 259 F.2d 393, 398 (5th Cir. 1958).
19 De Hardit v. United States, 224 F.2d 673, 677-678 (4th Cir. 1955).20 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485 (1958).21 De Hardit v. United States, 224 F.2d 673, 677-678 (4th Cir. 1955).22 United States v. De Hardit, 120 F. Supp. 110, 116 (E.D.Va. 1954), aff'd,
224 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1955).23Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b) (1).2 4 See United States v. Gross, 159 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D.Nev. 1958).
25354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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based on incriminating statements obtained during a period of
illegal detention be set aside.
Under Rule 5(b), the commissioner is charged with the
obligation to inform the person arrested of the nature of the
charge against him; his right to counsel; and his right not to make
a statement unless he wishes to, and, if the defendant desires it,
the commissioner must conduct a preliminary examination for the
purpose of determining if probable cause for holding him exists.28
If the defendant waives the preliminary examination, the com-
missioner must hold for the district court,27 but if it is requested,
the commissioner must hear the evidence within a reasonable
time.28 There being no requirement that the preliminary examina-
tion be held contemporaneously with the original appearance
before the commissioner, the United States attorney, in felony
cases, may request a continuance for the specific purpose of
procuring a grand jury indictment; there being no necessity that
a preliminary examination precede an indictment, the grand jury
is free to act. Once the indictment is returned it constitutes a
finding of probable cause and the preliminary hearing before the
commissioner is effectively circumvented.
At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, the com-
missioner must find that there is probable cause to believe a crime
has been committed and the accused committed it; if such a
finding is not possible the commissioner must release the de-
fendant.30 Even though the commissioner has found probable
cause, the district court, in its supervisory capacity, may review
the correctness of his determination.31
The purpose of the preliminary examination is to prevent a
person arrested from being held in custody without a prompt
hearing; the commissioner's determination of the sufficiency of
20 It is reversible error if the commissioner fails to notify the defendant of his
right to be represented by counsel at the preliminary examination, Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).27 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c).
28 Ibid. The commissioner may grant a continuance to allow either side time
to prepare its case. United States v. Ewing, 140 U.S. 142, 150 (1891); United
States v. Gray, 87 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D.D.C. 1949). One commissioner may
transfer the preliminary examination to another within the same judicial district
pending the adjournment. In re Wahll, 42 Fed. 822, 824 (D.Minn. 1890).29 E.g., James v. Lawrence, 176 F.2d 18, 20 (D.C.Cir. 1949).30 Fed. R. Grim. P. 5(c).3 1 United States v. Florida, 165 F. Supp. 328, 334 (E.D.Ark. 1958); United
States v. Zerbst, 111 F. Supp. 807, 810 (E.D.S.C. 1953).
1964]
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the evidence provides protection against any such unjust incar-
ceration.32 The commissioner's function as a committing magis-
trate under Rule 5 terminates once the case is transferred to the
district court,33 who if they wished could abolish the use of
United States commissioners and handle all magisterial duties
themselves.3 4 However, the increased use of commissioners pre-
cludes the district courts from having to make decisions on
matters which, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
commissioners are able to free them of.
Frequently, proceedings before the commissioner under Rule
5(c) will be referred to as an "arraignment," but this is an incor-
rect use of that term inasmuch as the commissioner may not
accept a plea whether the preliminary examination is waived or
not.35 If an accused insists on admitting his guilt before the
commissioner, it will only succeed in serving as a waiver to the
district court.36
The so-called Mallory rule has caused considerable contro-
versy over what will be construed by the courts to be unnecessary
delay within the meaning of Rule 5(a). Because commissioners
are not always available when defendants are arrested, there has
been much debate over whether United States commissioners
3 2 Barbee v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 807 (4th Cir. 1944); United States
v. Lucas, 13 F.R.D. 177 (D.D.C. 1952), appeal dismissed, 201 F.2d 182 (D.C.
Cir. 1952); United States v. Gray, 87 F. Supp. 436, 487 (D.D.C. 1949). Not
every person arrested need be brought before a commissioner for a determination
of probable cause; in certain situations this issue will have already been de-
termined; such is the case where a convicted defendant free on bail is picked up
on a bench warrant, McNeil v. Gray, 158 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D.Mass. 1957); a
defendant has elected to be proceeded against by information, United States v.
Maher, 89 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D.Me. 1950); an indictment has been returned by
a grand jury, Davis v. United States, 210 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir. 1954); United
States v. Slaugenhoupt, 102 F. Supp. 820 (W.D.Pa. 1952); United States ex rel.
Perry v. Hiatt, 33 F. Supp. 1022 (M.D.Pa. 1940).
Swanson v. United States, 224 F.2d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 1955); Freeman v.
United States, 160 F.2d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1946); United States v. Napela, 28 F.2d
898, 900 (N.D.N.Y. 1928); letter from the Director of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts to the Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, June 21,
1956, in 1957 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1900, 1901 (1958); see also Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 5(a), n. 1.
34 United States v. Hughes, 70 Fed. 972, 973 (E.D.S.C. 1895); Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 54 (a)(2), n.n. 1, 2.
35 Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 835, 838 & n. 2a (D.C. Cir. 1960).
One commissioner finds that many attorneys who appear before him insist on
entering a plea, see Conan, Practice Before A United States Commissioner, 12
Syracuse L. Rev. 163 (1960).36 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5(c), n. 2; White v. United States, 200
F.2d 509, 512-513 (5th Cir. 1952), cert denied 345 U.S. 999 (1953), there
is no bar to a woman commissioner being appointea, as was the case here.
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must be on duty at all hours.3 7 Since the commissioner is under
the supervision and direction of the district court who appoints
him,3 he could be required to maintain office hours on a twenty-
four-hour a day basis.3 9 However, the District of Columbia" and
the ninth4' circuit have rejected the need for round the clock com-
missioners, requiring them to maintain only regular working
hours.
In one case the availability of a commissioner seventy-five
miles from the place of detention before whom the officers could
have brought their prisoner within hours after his arrest was held
to constitute an unnecessary delay; the court saying, "the prompt
taking of a detained person before a commissioner is as important
a duty as the prompt investigation of crime."42
The nearest commissioner being away, a federal agent traveled
thirty-seven miles to the next available commissioner where he
obtained an arrest warrant, returned to the place of detention and
transported his prisoner back only to arrive too late to bring him
before the commissioner, which was done the following morning.
The court held Rule 5(a) had not been violated.43
One defendant claimed that the Rule had been violated
because he had been arrested in the morning and not brought
before a commissioner until the following morning. The United
States commissioner, called as a witness, testified he was the only
one in the county and he did not maintain round the clock
office hours. The court found no unnecessary delay had taken
place.44
Federal officers after making an arrest discovered that the
commissioner, who was the only one on duty that day, had left his
office. The court in finding that Rule 5(a) had been violated said
37 See Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee to Study Decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 12, pt. 1 at 126, 130-131 (1957).
38 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 354 (1931).
39 Wilhiams v. United States, 278 F.2d 781, 796-797 (9th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960).40 Porter v. United States, 258 F.2d 685, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 906 (1959).41 Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 798 (9th Cr. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 951 (1960).
42 United States v. Skeeters, 122 F. Supp. 52, 56-57 (S.D. Cal. 1954).43 United States v. Corn, 54 F. Supp. 307, 310 (E.D. Wis. 1944).44 Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 798 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 951 (1960).
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KENTUcKY LAW JoURNAL
that the officers should have sought out the commissioner at his
home. The court was also of the opinion that the commissioner
would have carried out his duties under 5(a) at home or wherever
he might be found after he left his office, if only the officers had
requested him to do so.45
The requirement of Rule 5(a) is that the person arrested must
be taken before the "nearest available commissioner." This re-
quirement was at issue in one case where the arresting officer
drove the defendant sixty miles to bring him before a commis-
sioner. During the ride, incriminating statements were made
which the district court refused to exclude despite the defendant's
claim that the commissioner before whom he was taken was not
the nearest one available. On appeal, the court said that the
defendant should have raised the objection at his trial that he had
not been taken to the nearest town where a commissioner was
known to reside, nor had he shown that this commissioner was
available.46
In Mallory,4" the Supreme Court ruled that a delay of approxi-
mately eight hours was too long; therefore, one appellate court
was shocked by a defendant's contention that he was brought
before a commissioner too soon, when the appearance took place
within three hours of his arrest.4 8
D. R mvovAL ocm iNcs
Rule 40 of the Federal Rules establishes a procedure to be
followed when a person charged with a criminal offense is taken
into custody in a place other than the one in which the alleged
crime was committed; the carrying out of these requirements is
often the responsibility of United States commissioners. Where
the arrest is made is of great significance, for Rule 40 makes dif-
ferent provisions for arrests made in "nearby districts" and those
made in "distant districts." 9 The former occurs under the fol-
lowing circumstances:
45 Ginoza v. United States, 279 F.2d 616, 619-621 (9th Cir. 1960).46 Hagan v. United States, 245 F.2d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 1957).
47 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 450-451 (1957). The arrest was
made at 2 and 2:30 p.m.; the first attempt at bringing the accused before a com-
missioner was made at 10 p.m.48 Lathem v. United States, 259 F.2d 393, 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1958).
49 Compare Fed. R. Grim. P. 40(a) with 40(b).
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(1) A complaint has resulted in an arrest warrant being
issued and the actual arrest takes place in the same state, but in
a different federal judicial district; or in a different state, but the
place of arrest is less than 100 miles from the place where the
arrest warrant was issued;
(2) An arrest is made without a warrant for an offense com-
mitted in another federal judicial district within the same state
or committed in a different state, but the arrest is made less than
100 miles from the place of the offense.
If an arrest is made which falls into one of the above cate-
gories, the defendant must be taken before the nearest available
commissioner in the district where the arrest is made, where he
is entitled to have a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable
cause. If the commissioner finds this to exist, the defendant is
held for the district court where the prosecution is pending or
the offense committed. If the arrest is made on a warrant issued
after an indictment or information has been returned, the com-
missioner's only obligation is to set bail, there being no longer
any question of probable cause to be determined. 50
An arrest is considered made in a "distant district" if it is
pursuant to a warrant issued in another state and the arrest is
made at a point more than 100 miles from the place where the
warrant was issued or the arrest is made without a warrant for
an offense committed in another state at a place more than 100
miles from the place of arrest.51
A defendant arrested in a "distant district" must be taken
before the nearest available commissioner in the district where
the arrest is made without unnecessary delay. The commissioner
must advise him of his rights exactly as under Rule 5(a), with
the exception that if the defendant chooses to waive a preliminary
hearing, he must do so in writing; an oral waiver not being
sufficient as it is under Rule 5(c). If such a waiver is executed,
the court issues a warrant of removal to the place where the
prosecution is pending; if a preliminary examination is requested,
the commissioner must hear the evidence and report his findings
to the court who, if the commissioner has determined probable
5Old. 40(a); 18 U.S.C. § 8041 (1958) provides the statutory basis for this
rule. See Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 1951).5lId. 40(b) (1).
1964]
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cause for removal exists, must issue a warrant of removal or order
the defendant discharged.52 If the defendant is arrested pursuant
to an indictment, all that is required for a warrant of removal is
the production of a certified copy and a showing that the person
before the commissioner is the one named in the indictment.5 3
There is no appeal from the issuance of the warrant of re-
moval,54 but if the defendant is committed by the commissioner
because of his inability to post bond pending removal, habeas
corpus may be sought from the district court.5 5 The commis-
sioner's finding of probable cause for removal will be upset by
the district court only if there has been a strong abuse of dis-
cretion" or a complete refusal to consider the evidence presented
by the defendant.5 To reverse the commissioner, the Supreme
Court has held that the reviewing court must be able to say that
there existed no substantial ground for bringing the defendant to
trial.58
The situation frequently arises of a defendant, discharged by
one commissioner who has refused to find probable cause for
removal, being arrested again and taken before a second com-
missioner for another attempt. The Supreme Court commenting
on this practice has declared that "the utmost than can be said is
that the decision of a commissioner favorable to the accused is
persuasive and may be sufficient to justify like action upon a
second application; but it is not controlling."59 The Court sug-
52Id. 40(b)(2)(3); see United States ex rel. Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U.S.
396, 400 (1935); United States v. Kamofsky, 24 F. Supp. 51 (N.D.Pa. 1938).
In a rare case the district court may hold another hearing; see United States v.
Nichols, 96 F. Supp. 199 (D.Del. 1951).
531d. 40(b) (3); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 40, n. 3; see cases in
note 52, supra.54 Binion v. United States, 201 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 935 (1953); Meltzer v. United States, 188 F.2d 916 & n. 3 (9th Cir., 1951).
Fries v. United States, 284 Fed. 825 (9th Cir. 1922).
55 See Rumely v. McCarthy, 250 U.S. 283, 289 (1919); United States ex rel.
Struck v. United States Marshal, 197 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1952); United States ex
rel. Hagan v. Kelly, 101 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1939); Pratt v. United States, 279
Fed. 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1922); United States ex rel. Costello v. McDermott, 21
F. Supp. 608 (D.N.J. 1937). There is no appeal from the district court's refusal
to grant the writ. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1958).
56 United States ex rel. Scharlon v. Pulver, 54 F.2d 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1931).
57 United States ex rel. Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U.S. 396, 402 (1935); United
States ex rel. Tassell v. Mathues, 11 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1926).
58 United States ex rel. Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U.S. 396, 402 (1935).
59 United States ex rel. Rutz v. Levy, 268 U.S. 390, 394 (1925). But see
United States ex rel. Silberstein v. Mathues, 12 F.2d 787, 789 (E.D.Pa. 1926),
aff'd sub nom., Mathues v. United States ex rel. Schwartz, 19 F.2d 7, 9 (3d Cir.
1927).
[Vol. 52,
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gested that the second application should be made before the
district court and not before another commissioner. 60 However,
the lower federal courts have continued to allow the second
attempt at removal to be brought before a different commis-
sioner.61 But it should make no difference if the second attempt is
before a commissioner or a district judge for in conducting
removal proceedings both are functioning as committing magis-
trates.
E. SFncH W Aminms
A criminal case may often have its inception through the
issuance of a search warrant. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure authorize United States commissioners to issue such
warrants for persons or places located within the judicial district
for which he is appointed.2 The test, as in the case of arrest
warrants, is probable cause' 3 which the commissioner must
determine solely from the affidavits presented to him.6" As long
as he makes no independent determination that the grounds
alleged as justifying the search probably exist, the commissioner
may issue the warrant.65 He has no obligation to go behind the
affidavits to investigate their truth,6 and even a subsequent show-
ing that the affidavits were in fact false cannot invalidate the
warrant if the commissioner had at least some substantial basis
for believing their probable truth.17 Whether or not the facts
before the commissioner are sufficient to establish probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is a question of law, s and as
such is reviewable by the district court by virtue of its authority
to assume control in the preliminary stages of matters over which
6o United States ex rel. Rutz v. Levy, 268 U.S. 390, 394 (1925).
61 See United States ex rel. Maggio v. Schneider, 68 F.2d 50, 51 (3d Cir.
1933) United States ex rel. Povlin v. Hecht, 48 F.2d 90, 91 (2d Cir. 1931);
United States ex rel. Greenberg v. Epstein, 33 F.2d 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).62 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a) (c).
63 Id. 41(c).
64 United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712, 714 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 850 (1960); United States v. Office No. 508, 119 F. Supp. 24, 27
(W.D.La. 1954); United States v. Evans 97 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.Tenn. 1951).65 Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
853 U. S. 976 (1957); Gracie v. United States, 15 F.2d 644, 646 (1st Cir. 1926),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 748 (1927); United States v. Harnich, 289 Fed. 256, 258
(D.Conn. 1922).
66 United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1, 4 (E.D.Tenn. 1956).
O7 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271-272 (1960); see also United
States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219, 225 (W.D.Mo. 1931).68 See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 97 F. Supp, 95, 96 (E.D.Tenn. 1951).
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it has the final decision. 9 Review will come about by means of a
motion to suppress evidence under Rule 41(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.70 The only question that is open on
such a motion is the reasonableness of the commissioner's action
in issuing the search warrant;7' his judgment is conclusive unless
"arbitrarily exercised."72 New evidence which tends to contradict
the affidavits upon which the warrant was issued is not admis-
sable.7 3 Only if it can be found that the commissioner de-
liberately disregarded evidence74 will his judgment be overruled.
In a close case, the very fact that the commissioner made a
determination of probable cause is a very substantial factor tend-
ing to uphold the validity of the search warrant.7 5
Affidavits being the sole basis upon which a United States
commissioner may issue a search warrant, considerable case law
has developed concerning what they must contain before the
commissioner can make a determination that probable cause
exists. Neither the fourth amendment nor the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure set forth any special requirements as to the
form or contents of affidavits.70 Rule 41(c) does provide that the
warrant shall issue on affidavits sworn to before the commissioner.
This requirement cannot be satisfied if the affidavit is sworn to
before some other official and then presented to the commis-
sioner.77 However, if an affidavit not sworn to before a com-
missioner is presented along with others that are, a search warrant
69 In re No. 191 Front Sheet, 5 F.2d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 1924); In re Film
and Pictorial Representation of Dempsey-Tunney Fight, 22 F.2d 887, 839
(N.D.Ga. 1927). The power of a commissioner in issuing a search warrant is no
less than if it was issued by a district judge. United States ex rel. Finch v.
Elliott, 3 F.2d 496, 498 (W.D.Wash. 1924), af'd, 5 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir.
1925).
76 The motion may be made only to the district court not to the commissioner,
see Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 41(e).71 See, e.g., Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 863 (1957); United States v. Evans, 97 F. Supp. 95, 96
(E.D.Tenn. 1951).72 Meritt v. United States, 249 F.2d 19, 20 (6th Cir. 1957); Evans v. United
States, 242 F.2d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 353 U.S. 976 (1957);
Gracie v. United States, 15 F.2d 644, 646 (1st Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S.
748 (1927); United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539, 543 (E.D.Pa. 1959),
afTd, 278 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1960).73 United States v. Gianaris, 25 F.R.D. 194 (D.D.C. 1960).
74 United States v. Lotempio, 58 F.2d 358, 360 (W.D.N.Y. 1932).
75 United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 850 (1960).
76 Lowrey v. United States, 161 F.2d 80, 33 (8th Cir. 1957).
77 Davis v. United States, 35 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1929) (before a notary
public).
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is not invalid if the commissioner could determine probable cause
from the warrants that were properly sworn to before him.78 If
the officers seeking the warrant bring the person who provided
them with information before the commissioner, who then pro-
ceeds to inquire of the informant whether the statements in the
officers' affidavits are true, issuing the warrant not upon the sworn
affidavits, but upon the unsworn statements of the informant, the
search warrant is invalid.79
The commissioner's job is to make a determination that there
is probable cause to believe an offense is being committed as of
the time the warrant is sought and not at some prior time.80 The
warrant must identify the person or property to be searched."'
If the place to be searched is not recited in the warrant, the com-
missioner may not fill in this information in response to a tele-
phone call from the officers at the scene of the search.8 2 The
Federal Rules provide that once the warrant is issued, the search
must be carried out and a return of any property seized made
within ten days.83 If the warrant is not executed within the ten-
day period and the officers make application for a new one, the
commissioner may not issue it based solely on the affidavits
presented when the warrant was originally obtained and which
have not been supplemented so that the commissioner may find
that probable cause for a search exists at the time the second
warrant is requested.84
The issuance of search warrants is an area of law that is beset
with many distinctions and complexities; thus the comment of one
court that, "It is the plain duty of all United States Commissioners
carefully to study the search warrant provisions . . . and to
exercise scrupulous care that all proceedings before them and
processes issued by them conform strictly to the provisions of
[Rule 41]"85 is very timely.
78 Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 863 (1957); United States v. Stewart, 79 F. Supp. 313, 314 (E.D.Pa.
1948).
79 United States v. Pollack, 64 F. Supp. 554, 557 (D.N.J. 1946).80 Sigro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-211 (1932); Dixon v. United
States, 211 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1954).81 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c).82 United States v. Mitchell, 274 Fed. 128 (N.D.Cal. 1921).
8 3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d).8 4 Sigro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 211 (1932).
85 Murby v. United States, 293 Fed. 849, 851 (1st Cir. 1923).
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F. BAh
Any person arrested for the commission of a non-capital
federal crime has an absolute right to be admitted to bail."6 The
enforcement of this right frequently is the responsibility of United
States commissioners, 7 for the first contact that an arrested
person has with the federal judicial machinery often comes with
his appearance before the commissioner. Such an appearance for
the purpose of setting bail may come about in any of several ways:
there may be an arrest on a warrant issued after an indictment
or information has been returned; the commissioner after con-
ducting a preliminary examination may find there is probable
cause to hold the person arrested; or a fugitive from justice may
be arrested in a judicial district other than the one in which the
offense was committed.
The amount to be set as bail is subject to the commissioner's
discretion, but he must apply the criteria set forth in Rule 46(c).
If the defendant challenges the amount set by the commissioner
as excessive, he may make a motion to reduce bail in the district
court from whose decision he may appeal.88 If the district court
hearing the motion decides that the commissioner has set an
excessive amount, a reduction must be ordered for "there is no
discretion to refuse to reduce excessive bail."89 In one case90
involving the setting of what appeared to be excessive bail, the
defendant, arrested in California pursuant to an indictment re-
turned in New York, was committed pending removal in default
of 100,000 dollars bail set by a commissioner. The defendant
sought to reduce the amount as excessive. The district court
granted the motion, but the court of appeals reversed saying that
the defendant must seek his remedy for excessive bail from the
courts of the jurisdiction where the indictment was returned. It
also said, "There seems to be no Constitutional requirement that
any bail be fixed until the defendant is in the jurisdiction of the
86 Fed. R. Grim. P. 46(a) (I) See Stack v. Boyle, =4 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
87 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1958 authorizes bail to be taken by a magistrate
authorized to arrest and commit offenders viz. United States commissioners. 28
U.S.C. § 637 (1958) provides specific authorization for the commissioner to admit
to bail.88 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951).
89 Ibid.90 Meltzer v. United States, 188 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1951).
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court of indictment.... The District Court had no right to over-
rule the discretion of the commissioner in a matter committed
to the official as a grace to the defendant."9 It would seem that
the appellate court was wrong, for the defendant had a right to be
admitted to non-excessive bail under Rule 40(b) (2) (8). The
commissioner has no power to set bail in capital cases, 92 nor may
he do so once the defendant has been convicted; 93 in both these
areas release on bond must be sought from the court. A commis-
sioner may order a prisoner brought before him to allow bail to
be givenP4 and there is no objection to his setting bail on a
Sunday. 5 Commissioners may order material witnesses to give
bail for their appearance and is empowered to order their com-
mitment if they fail to do soY6 Proceedings involving the justifica-
tion of sureties may be held before commissioners, 7 but a United
States commissioner may not declare the forfeiture of a bail bond;
this is reserved to the district court.98
While the district courts could, if they wished, assume com-
plete control of matters pertaining to bail and eliminate this
function of the commissioner,9 9 their continued use relieves over-
worked judges of a great burden leaving them more time to
devote to court matters. The late Mr. Justice Jackson recognized
the importance of the work done by commissioners in this area
when he commented that "the first fixing of bail by a commis-
sioner is a serious exercise of judicial discretion."100
G. TQALs BEFonE ComnmssioNmas
United States commissioners, specially designated by the
appointing district court, have jurisdiction to try and sentence
persons who commit petty offenses any place within the judicial
91 Id. at 915. In a companion case, Meltzer v. United States, 188 F.2d 916,
917 (9th Cir. 1951), the court said "bail on removal is in the discretion of the
trial court," interpreting Rule 46(a) (1) out of context.
0 2 Fed. R. Grim. P. 46 (a) (1); 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1958).
93 Id. 46 (a) (2); see United States v. McGee, 39 F 2d 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1930).4 United States v. Hardin, 10 Fed. 802, 808-809 (W.D.N.C. 1881).
95 DeOrozco v. United States, 237 Fed. 1008, 1013 (5th Cir. 1916).
96Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(b); Hallett v. United States, 63 Fed. 817, 822 (D.
Mass. 1894).
97 Id. 46(e); see United States v. Cook, 17 F.R.D. 412, 414 (S.D.Tex. 1955).
981d. 46(f)(1); Swanson v. United States, 224 F.2d 795, 799 (9th Cir.
1955), reversing United States v. Lewis, 115 F. Supp. 528 (D. Alaska 1953).99 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 854 (1931).
100 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 11 (1951).
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district that is subject to federal authority-"1 However, the
defendant has the right to elect to be tried before he district court
and the commissioner must so advise him and procure a waiver
of this right. 2 In the event of conviction before the commis-
sioner, there is an automatic right of appeal to the district court. 03
That this right does not seem to be frequently exercised is
evidenced by the fact that there is only one such reported case. 04
Trials before commissioners are governed by a special set of rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court and not by the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 10 5 Most of the petty offense matters tried
before commissioners stem from infractions committed on military
reservations and in national parks and forests.'( The latter is
important because each national park commissioner is also a
United States commissioner authorized to try petty offenses com-
mitted in the national park for which he is appointed.1 7
H. THE COMMIsSIONER SYSTEM-WHAT CHANGES?
"The system of United States Commissioners serves a neces-
sary and useful purpose in the Federal judicial system and.., on
the whole, it is working well. The system needs improvement,
however, in a number of respects... ."-1o8 Although this statement
is as true today as it was when made almost twenty years ago, no
significant changes in the commissioner system have been forth-
coming in the interim.
Considering the importance of the judicial functions which a
commissioner is daily required to perform there should be an
absolute requirement that all commissioners be lawyers. The day
of the lay-judge is rapidly declining and a commissioner, vested
101 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (1958). A pretty offense is "any misdemeanor, the
penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a
fne of not more than $500 or both .. ' 18 U.S.C. § 1 (8) (1958).
10218 U.S.C. § 8401(b) (1958).
10318 U.S.C. § 3402 (1958).
104 United States v. Jones, 141 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.Va. 1956), where the
defendant was tampering with a government owned vehicle on a naval base.
105 "Rules of Procedure for Trials Before Commssioners" may be found in
18 U.S.C. following the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to Rule 54(b)(4).
106 King, The Proposed Abolition of United States Commissioners, 37 J. Am.
Jud. Soc'y 116, 119 (1953).
10728 U.S.C. § 632 (1958).
108 Letter from the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, December 7, 1948, in
1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1326, 1327 (1947).
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with the important discretion and power that he is, should be in a
position to bring a legally trained mind to bear on matters that
come before him. It is not enough that lawyers are preferred
for the post when they may be available as indicated by the
latest figures which show that of the 670 commissioners serving
part time, 503 are lawyers.10 9
The abolition of the fee system as a means of compensation
would go a long way toward attracting lawyers to serve as
commissioners. Compensating judicial officials according to the
volume of business they handle is an anachronism and something
which cannot be squared with sound judicial administration. 110
The Administrative Office of United States Courts has indicated
its preference for a fixed salary as a means of compensation of
commissioners."1 The chief obstacle seems to be the fact that
not all commissioners put in the same amount of time at their
work." 2 It would be ideal to be able to propose that the office
of United States Commissioner be required to be a full time
occupation. However, the amount of business in certain areas
of the country does not justify or require the services of a full
time commissioner. The necessity and importance of having
a commissioner available in all sections of the country, no matter
how infrequently called upon, makes part time commissioners an
element of the system that must be retained. This does not
compel a perpetuation of compensation by fees rather than a
fixed salary. There would be no bar to paying full time commis-
sioners a substantially larger salary than that paid to those re-
quired for part time work only. The salary differentiation
between these two classes could be worked out on the basis
of recommendations to Congress by the Judicial Conference of
the United States." 3
109 [1962] Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Ann. Rep. 165 (1963). Of the remaining 167 part time commissioners, sixty-three
are district court clerks or deputy clerks, referees in bankruptcy and one court
reporter; presumably some of these persons are members of the bar, leaving only
103 commissioners who are definitely not lawyers.
110 See Lederle, Abolish Unnecessary Court Appendages to Improve the Ad-
ministration of justice, 36 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 102, 103 (1952).
111 See letter, op. cit. supra note 108.112 Ibid.
113 The Judicial Conference has given its approval to legislation that would
revise the fee schedule and raise the annual maximum fee limit from 10,500
dollars to 12,500 dollars. See [1961] Judicial Conference of the United States
Ann. Rep. 93-94 (1960); [1960] Judicial Conference of the United States Ann.
Rep. 41 (1961).
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The burdens under which the federal district courts function
in their daily activities can be lessened to a great extent by the
more effective use of United States commissioners." 4 It is sug-
gested that at present these courts do not in fact use the commis-
sioner system to its full potential. District judges are sill per-
forming tasks that under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be handled by commissioners, allowing the courts additional
time for more pressing matters.
At present the trial jurisdiction of United States commissioners
is limited to petty offenses committed on federal reservations;" 5
it is suggested that they be given the statutory jurisdiction to try
all federal misdemeanors committed anywhere within the district
for which they are appointed, preserving the present requirement
that the defendant waive his right to be tried before the district
court; this would preclude any argument that giving the commis-
sioner such jurisdiction would result in infringement upon a con-
stitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial."0
Finally, the title "commissioner" can hardly be said to be
descriptive of the duties and responsibilities of the office. In
point of fact, the United States commissioners are federal magis-
trates. Reference to commissioners as "quasi-judicial officers"
seems improper in light of the importance of the place of the
commissioner in the federal judicial system.
It would be appropriate to give United States commissioners
full judicial standing and the office what in effect is its proper
designation, "United States Magistrate."
114 See King, The Proposed Abolition of United States Commissioners, 37 J.
Am. Jud. Soc'y 116 (1953).
115 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (1958).
116 The Judicial Conference has indicated its approval of legislation that
would expand the commissioner's trial jurisdiction to include "an offense punish-
able by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than$1,000, or both." [1961] Judicial Conference of the United States Ann. Rep. 95(1962); [1960] Judicial Conference of the United States Ann. Rep. 41-42 (1961).
However, this would not change the requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) that the
offense, to be triable by the commissioner, must be committed "in any place over
which Congress has exclusive power to legislate or over which the United States
has concurrent jurisdiction... .
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